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COMMENT.
Few judicial decisions have aroused more popular disapproval
than that declaring void Mr. Tilden's will. Popular criticism
of judicial decisions is generally unjust. It forgets that the
general principle must control the equity of the individual
case. But in this case there is some ground for the popular
feeling. It is certain that the intention of a testator was
never more plainly or clearly expressed. It is equally certain
that it was never more completely disregarded. And it may
be said with some justice that rarely or never has the practical
purposes aimed at by the law been more completely lost sight of
in the subtlety of technical construction. Mr. Tilden after making
some special bequests vested the rest of his property in certain
trustees and executors for executing the purposes of the trusts.
He defined these purposes by requesting his trustees to obtain the
incorporation of the Tilden Trust with power to establish a free
library in the City of New York, and to promote such other scien-
tific and educational purposes as the trustees might deem proper.
If they thought it expedient they were then to convey the entire
residuary property to the trust in fulfillment of these purposes; if
not, they were to use it independently for such charitable educa-
tional and scientific purposes as would in their judgment most
widely and substantially benefit mankind. The law of New York
requires an imperative trust, which defines the purpose for which
the property given in trust must be used, to have a definite bene-
ficiary who can enforce the trust. But a trust or power in trust
whose execution is discretionary in the trustee or donee is valid
where no definite beneficiary exists. Both the majority and minority
opinion held the general clause void for uncertainty. The differ-
ence of opinion rose in the construction of the Tilden Trust. As
the power to convey to that trust was discretionary in the trustee,
and as a discretionary power is a valid power, the minority of three
judges held that the invalidity of the general clause could not
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affect the disposition of the property until the trustees had exer-
cised their discretion, and that the actual incorporation of the Tilden
Trust and the conveyance to it by the trustees of all the residuary
estate made it of no importance whether the ultimate disposition
was or was not valid. Its invalidity could have affected the heirs
only in case the trustee failed to convey to the Tilden Trust. The
testator's intention had therefore been lawfully carried out. But
the majority held that while the creation of the Tilden Trust was
discretionary, it was but one of an indefinite and unlimited num-
ber of means by which the ultimate and imperative end of the will
was to be carried out. There was no discretion in the trustees as
to the purposes for which the property was to be used. The trust
raised by the will in them imperatively required a disposition to
charity in some manner or other. The Tilden Trust was a possi-
ble means, which did not affect the general purpose. As the gen-
eral purpose was imperative, the trust was an imperative trust
without a beneficiary and void. The reasoning by which this con-
clusion is reached may be sound. In one respect, however, it is
curious. The effect of striking out the general clause, says the
-majority opinion, would be to destroy the intentions of the testa-
tor. For he did not intend to confer upon his trustees the option
of deciding whether his property should go to the Tilden Trust or
to his heirs; and if they failed to endow the Tilden Trust, as they
might if they chose, the property could go nowhere else. But
the testator has declared that his trustees shall have option only as
to means but not as to ends. Therefore, although the Tilden Trust
has been created as the testator desired and all the residuary prop-
erty has been conveyed to it - also as the testator desired, - never-
theless, as the trustees might have chosen not to incorporate and
endow the Tilden Trust, and might have thrown the residuary
property into the hands of the heirs by so failing, and might thus
have exercised a power which the testator did not mean to confer
upon them - we will declare the whole will void in order not to
defeat his intention and will give all his property to his heirs because
the trustees might have so indirectly given it.
Is it not a question whether the usefulness of the law and its
value as a practical guide to conduct is impaired, when a refined
and intricate construction, which nullifies, is adopted, instead of a
broad and generous one which upholds ? In this instance the
anxiety of the court not to defeat the testator's intention resulted
in giving his entire estate to the heirs whose legacies he had
expressly declared should be stricken out of his will if they caused
it to be contested.
COMMENT.
Mr. Justice Lamar, as Circuit Justice, has just given in the
northern district of Mississippi, a decision in a curious case, which
will gratify strict constructionists. A U. S. deputy marshal
for a district of Tennessee had received, while in Mississippi,
notice of the whereabouts of a criminal for whose arrest he had a
lawful warrant with him. He borrowed a pistol of a deputy
sheriff in Mississippi to effect the arrest with; whereupon a zeal-
ous mayor, catching a glimpse of the protruding handle, had him
promptly arrested and jailed for the offence of carrying concealed
weapons, contrary to the law of Mississippi. After further reflec-
tion, however, the municipal officials began to waver. It did not
seem so clear that a U. S. marshal could be arrested by State
authorities for carrying concealed weapons. He was released,
and proceeded to make the arrest in his own district. Returning
to Mississippi he was again arrested on the old charge, and this
time tried and severely fined. Upon appeal to the Circuit Court
it was alleged that, as he was setting out to make a lawful arrest,
he was executing the law of the United States, and had a right to
carry a pistol, if that were necessary to accomplish the purpose,
and that while executing the laws of the United States he was
under their protection. But the Justice held that he was only a
-private citizen while beyond the limits of his district, and it was of
no consequence that somewhere else he had an official character;
and as to that section of the revised statutes which provides that,
"the marshals and their deputies shall have in each State the
same powers in executing the laws of the United States as the
sheriffs and their deputies in such State may have by law in exe-
cuting the laws thereof," said: "the argument is that as in the per-
formance of their duty the sheriffs and their deputies in Missis-
sippi have a right to carry a pistol, therefore the relator as a dep-
uty United States marshal for the western district of Tennessee,
should have the same right. This conclusion is a azon-sequitur.
That section of the statute will not warrant such a construction.
It was never intended by that section to enlarge the territorial
jurisdiction of the U. S. marshals and their deputies, which is the
logical effect of the construction contended for. * * * It
means simply that the U. S. marshals and their deputies within
their respective districts, shall have in the States the same powers
in executing the law of the U. S. as the sheriffs and their deputies
have by law in executing the laws thereof." (Walker v. Zea, 47
Fed. Rep. 645).
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Under a statute similar to those existing in most States,
providing for the forfeiture of the charter of a corporation for the
violation of any of its provisions or failure to exercise the powers
conferred by it, the New York Court of Appeals has recently ren-
dered a decision, part of which is well worth producing here.
After quoting the statute it continues, in part as follows :
"* * * The statute does not execute itself, but requires
the action of the attorney-general to make it effective. Even the
willful neglect of a railroad corporation to exercise all its fran-
chises does not, of itself, terminate its corporate existence; but to
effect that result, the State, through its attorney-general, must
not only elect to enforce the forfeiture, but also .procure leave of
court to bring an action for that purpose. Such actions are not
even then maintainable, except some public interest is involved
which requires the exercise of the franchise by the corporation.
It was therefore incumbent upon the State to show upon the trial
of the action that a cause of forfeiture had not only been incurred
by the corporation, but that it continued to exist, and that its
existence involved some public interest, and also that the court
had authorized the bringing of the action. An action thus com-
menced is even then necessarily always within the control of the
State, as the sole party interested, to prosecute or abandon, at its
mere will and pleasure. It is responsible to no one for the exer-
cise of its discretion in this respect. * * * By enforcing
the forfeiture of corporate existence the State receives no benefit
and acquires no property, and by waiving such forfeiture it loses
no privilege and interferes with no vested right. Having the
absolute power at will to take the corporate life, it does not ham-
per its freedom of action by forbidding its servants, in specified
cases, from prosecuting actions for forfeiture. It requires no
exercise of judicial power to enable it to waive a forfeiture, but it
may be effectuated by the mere expression of its will, and its will
may be based upon cause or utterly without one: Having abso-
lute power, as the supreme representative of the people, in respect
to the question, it may do so with or without cause, or upon what-
ever terms or conditions it.may see fit to impose." (Opinion by
Riuger, C. J., in People v. Ulster & 'D. R. Co., 28 N. E. Rep. 636.)
There being no innkeeper's liability act in Indiana, the
Supreme Court of the State has recently passed 'upon a case
(Bowell v. De Wald, 28 N. E. Rep. 430) somewhat similar to that
of Peckham v. Barnes, which has for so long a time done service in
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our Moot Courts. They hold that at common law the failure of a
guest to inform the innkeeper or his servant that his valise con-
tained valuables does not constitute negligence. An innkeeper is
an insurer of all goods entrusted to his care, and the fact that he
may not know the value of a particular valise entrusted to him or
his servant does not lessen his liability.
In the case of Peo~ple ex. rel. -Fitzgerald, .Mayor, v. Whipple et
al., 49 N. W. Rep. 822, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
"a mandamus will not lie to compel the members of a city coun-
cil to attend the meetings thereof."
The views expressed in Mr. Thomas Thacher's article, "Incor-
poration in one State for business to be done in another," have
received confirmation in Demarest v. Grant, New York Court of
Appeals, published, since the article was received, in 28 North
Eastern Rep. 645.
